Mark Perakh published an extensive article refuting many of the positions taken by members of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists in its book Challenge.
He has this to say about the Rebbe's letter on science and Torah:
… The second section contains papers which deal more specifically with the controversy between the Genesis, geology and evolution. It opens with a paper by Rabbi M. Schneerson which in a certain sense stands alone, for its level of discourse is well below the majority of articles in the collection. Since, however, the author of that paper was acclaimed as a great thinker of this century, let us take a closer look at his article.…
The article by Rabbi M. Schneerson
Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, the seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe, is characterized in the collection as "one of the outstanding Torah personalities of the present generation." (The quoted characterization was printed in 1978; since then Rabbi Schneerson has passed away). The authority M. Schneerson enjoyed in his lifetime among his followers was enormous. Many of them viewed him as a modern Moses or even as a Messiah. Here is a telltale detail. When a magnificent synagogue was built in Miami Beach, Florida, stones were brought to be put into its foundation from two places – one was the Kotel Hamaaravi, the western wall of the destroyed Temple in Jerusalem, and the other was the house in Brooklyn, NY where the seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe lived. Of course, I know of no arguments which would cast doubt on Rabbi Schneerson's reputation as a great man of the Torah. I would never try to dispute the above characterization of the esteemed Rabbi. Neither would I ever try to argue with Rabbi Schneerson about any question relating, say, to the Talmud, Halakha, or the like.
However, in the paper published in the collection Challenge Schneerson endeavored to discuss science, and this is an area where I, having been a practicing experimental physicist for fifty years, may legitimately argue against Schneerson's notions.
When I recently attended a conference where the relationship between science and the Torah was discussed, I accidentally overheard professor Herman Branover (who is a very active figure in the organized activities aimed at proving the supremacy of the Torah over science) say that the Lubavitcher Rebbe was beyond doubt not only a great man of the Torah but also one of the greatest scientists in the world, and the utmost authority in every field of science.
From the collection Challenge we learn that M. M. Schneerson studied at the university of Berlin, Germany and at the Sorbonne in Paris.[1] Unfortunately, the biographical segment in the collection in question does not tell us either which subjects Rabbi Schneerson studied in the mentioned universities or for how long.[2] There is no information available regarding any possible contribution by Schneerson to any specific field of science.[3] It seems safe to assume that he never performed any scientific work in any field of science.[4] It seems safe to assume he had no personal experience in conducting scientific experiments, sorting out and interpreting experimental data, developing any scientific theories, participating in discussions of any specific scientific ideas and generally being involved in any real scientific activity,[5] which is the only way a person acquires a real understanding of what a work of science is all about.
Reading Schneerson's article leads to the conclusion that he had no real understanding of the scientific method and of the essence of the scientific exploration of reality. His paper is an odd mix of platitudes and misrepresentations of science.
Among the platitudes in question is his assertion that "at best science can only speak in terms of theories inferred from certain known facts..." How true! Why, though, this situation, which is not being disputed by any scientist, should be viewed as a weakness, as Rabbi Schneerson seems to imply, remains his secret. Yes, science speaks in terms of theories inferred from known facts. How much more credible the Torah would be if it also spoke in terms of theories inferred from known facts! If, as Rabbi Schneerson indicated, using theories inferred from known facts is a limitation of science, what about the Torah whose statements are not inferred from any known facts but are simply unsubstantiated assertions without any factual basis?
Among Rabbi Schneerson's misrepresentations of science was his alleged explanation of two methods utilized by science, one being extrapolation and the other, interpolation. The explanation in question was primitive in the extreme. It reduced the scientific method to only two possible variations, which of course is a gross simplification. Moreover, he distorted the essence of the two methods in question. .
Interpolation, Rabbi Schneerson taught us, is a method "whereby, knowing the reaction under two extremes, we attempt to infer what the reaction might be at any point between the two." If we replaced the word "reaction" with the word "value," the above definition would be an adequate one for a mathematical operation of interpolation. However, it falls short of being a proper definition of any legitimate procedure employed in science. In physics, chemistry, biology, the simplistic inference of what the "reaction" might be at an intermediary point between two extreme" points where the reaction has been studied is not a proper way to develop a theory. Any interpolation, if it takes place at all, is never a bare guess but is always based on certain information enabling the researcher to reasonably predict the behavior of a system under study between the two known "extremes."
That such interpolations are legitimate and not at all arbitrary is seen from the great successes of science which have led to the enormous progress of technology we all witness. The very picture presented by Schneerson, whereby there is information available at some two points, say A and B, and from that, information related to a point C located between A and B is inferred, is in itself a distortion of the scientific procedure. If an interpolation (which is a legitimate course of action in experimental science) is employed it is not normally based on the information related to just two extreme points.
Let us discuss the question of a legitimate interpolation by using a specific example. Since Schneerson used the term "reaction" it seems appropriate to consider an example from chemistry. Imagine that a study is conducted whereby the dependence of the rate of an electrochemical reaction on parameters such as temperature, current density, solution composition, etc., is investigated. One of the common methods of experimental study is to gradually change one of the parameters (for example, temperature) while keeping all the rest of the parameters constant (within a certain range). The researcher chooses a discrete set of values of temperature, for example, 300 K, 320 K, 340 K, 360 K, 380 K, 400 K. (K stands for Kelvin, which is the thermodynamic unit of temperature; 1 K equals one degree Celsius). The researcher makes an effort to keep the variations of current density, solution composition and all other parameters as small as possible, and measures the reaction rate at the listed six values of temperature. She necessarily repeats the measurements many times, thus determining the margin of error. When she is satisfied that the repetition of measurements generates values which all are within the same margin of error, she applies some mathematical treatment to her data, for example, the least square fit. The result of the described meticulous procedure is some curve reflecting the dependence of the reaction rate on temperature, corresponding to the fixed values of current density, solution composition etc. Then the entire procedure is repeated for another value of current density, or for another value of concentration of solution components, etc. After many such measurements have been completed, the researcher has a family of curves, each showing the dependence of the reaction rate on temperature, but for various current densities or various concentrations of the solution components. This procedure is very far from the simplistic picture given by Schneerson, whereby the data for two extremes are used to infer the data for an intermediate point. The rate of reaction for, say, a temperature of 310 K, which is between the actually measured points at 300 K and 320 K, is estimated not just from the two values at 300 K and 320 K but from the entire consistent combination of multiple experimental points. The necessary next step is to form an explanation of the experimental curves in question. Such an explanation is never arbitrary, but is based on the enormous body of knowledge accumulated in science. Since the theory must explain a multitude of experimental data rather than just two values at some two points, as Schneerson naively suggested, there are usually not too many choices which would reasonably fit all the experimental points. Finally, when a theory is developed which seems to account for the entire set of experimental data, it is used to predict the outcome of other experiments. If, in the course of the further studies by various researchers the predictions of the theory are reasonably confirmed, the theory becomes a part of the scientific arsenal, as a reasonably plausible interpretation of facts. It is never viewed as the absolute truth, but usually every good scientific theory contains at least a grain of truth in it. This example illustrates that Schneerson's description of interpolation falls short of being an adequate presentation of a scientific method.
Then Schneerson spoke about extrapolation, which, he asserted, is inferior to interpolation. He gave the following definition and an example: "The method of extrapolation, whereby inferences are made beyond a known range, on the basis of certain variables within the known range. For example, suppose we know the variables of a certain element within a temperature range of 00 and 1000 , and on the basis of this we estimate what the reaction might be at 1010 , 2000 , or 20000 ... Of the two methods, the second (extrapolation) is clearly the more uncertain. Moreover, the uncertainty increases with the distance away from the known range."
Like in the case of interpolation, Schneerson's description is a gross simplification and hence a distortion of a real scientific procedure. No scientist would ever simply guess what "the reaction" would be at 1010 or 20000 based on the data for 1000 alone. Any extrapolation, if employed in genuine scientific research, is based on a multitude of data which establish a well-documented trend. Besides the particular set of data at the scientist's disposal, she always bases her extrapolation also on the enormous wealth of multifaceted knowledge accumulated in science about the "reaction" in question.
Scientific theories are not built upon either simple interpolation or simple extrapolation, but rather on a combination of various mutually controlling methods and firmly established trends. The power and fruitfulness of the scientific method are obvious. It is impossible to deny the amazing achievements of science and the technology based upon scientific discoveries.
Schneerson continued: "... a generalization inferred from a known consequent to an unknown antecedent is more speculative than an inference from an antecedent to consequent." To illustrate that assertion, Schneerson offers an example: " Four divided by two equals two. Here the antecedent is represented by the dividend and the divisor, and the consequent – by the quotient (2) ...However, if we know only the end result, namely the number, 2, and we ask ourselves, how can we arrive at the number 2, the answer permits several possibilities, arrived at by means of different methods: 1)1 plus 1 equals 2; 2) 4-2 equals 2, 3) 4/2 equals 2..." This arithmetic platitude, contrary to Schneerson's view, is utterly irrelevant to the question of the validity of scientific theories. It is arithmetically correct that the number 2 can be obtained by an endless number of arithmetic procedures. However, in scientific research the inference from a consequent to an antecedent is never made simply based on some number alone. If a researcher obtains, as a result of a measurement, a certain individual number, be it 2 or anything else, he never tries to draw any conclusion as to what caused this number by limiting his discussion to that number alone. Any conclusion "from consequent to antecedent" is offered on the basis of a multitude of data, which show a distinctive trend, and taking into account the large body of information accumulated by science about the reaction in question and other similar reactions.
Furthermore, Schneerson's assertion that "a generalization inferred from a known consequent to an unknown antecedent is more speculative than an inference from an antecedent to consequent" is factually wrong. The procedure Schneerson refers to as an inference from a consequent to antecedent is the most common one in science, and boils down to developing a theory explaining a set of known facts. On the other hand the procedure he refers to as inference from antecedent to consequent is actually using a theory to predict the outcome of experiments yet to be performed. More often than not, the former is less speculative than the latter, which is contrary to Scheersohn's dilettantish assertion. If a set of experimental data is sufficiently large, a theory explaining it can be reasonably substantiated. On the other hand, predicting the results of future experiments is a more speculative endeavor. Therefore the actual occurrence of events predicted by a theory is normally viewed as a more convincing argument in favor of that theory than simply an explanation by a theory of the already available data.
Of course, scientific theories can be wrong. If that is the case, they usually have a very short life. Every theory, even if it explains a certain set of data very well, is always subjected to multiple unmerciful tests, probing the limits of its applicability. The process of establishing an accepted scientific theory is very complex and quite different from the simplistic picture painted by Schneerson. This process includes many facets, starting with measurements, followed by offering some hypothetical explanation of experimental data which is aimed at forming a logically consistent concept accounting for every experimental fact, then followed by designing additional experiments whose outcome can be predicted on the base of the hypothesis in question, testing the prediction, then amending the hypothesis, etc.
Contrary to Schneerson's view, this elaborate procedure ensures the high reliability of scientific theories, although none of them, unlike the Torah, is viewed as the absolute truth.
Schneerson continued his attack on the validity of science by listing a number of weaknesses plaguing scientific theories. Among those weaknesses is, for example, that scientific theories "have been advanced on the basis of observable data during a relatively short period of time." Since Schneerson's thesis is that the Torah provides more reliable information than science, a legitimate question is, what are those "observable data" which form the foundation of the Torah's story? There are no such data for either long or short period of time. Why then should we prefer the Torah's story to scientific theories?
Another weakness of science is, according to Schneerson, that "on the basis of such a relatively small range of known (though by no means perfectly) data scientists venture to build theories by the weak method of extrapolation, and from the consequent to the antecedent, extending to many thousands (according to them, to millions and billions) of years!" This quotation shows once again Schneerson's primitive level of understanding of scientific theories. The age of the universe has been estimated in science through many different methods, all providing fairly consistent numbers. All these estimates are based on firmly established regularities with no indications whatsoever that any such regularity could not have been at work at any time in the past. Of course, there is no way to conduct a direct experiment to test if a certain regularity (for example, the constant rate of a radioactive decay of certain elements) indeed had been at work, say, a billion years ago. However, the large body of experimental evidence provides a reasonable foundation to believe that the regularity in question indeed was a feature of the world a billion years ago as it is now. Rabbi Schneerson might believe, if he was so inclined, that, for example, the rate of the radioactive decay was not constant in the course of millennia. By the same token, I may believe that the moon is made of green cheese. Those who do not share such a belief, may ask me: "What about the reports by American astronauts who landed on the moon and brought samples of its material back to the earth?" I can answer: "Well, Armstrong and the other astronauts may have lied. And, generally, all those TV images of people on the moon were made in Hollywood, and also there is a government's conspiracy to hide the truth about the moon, which is actually made of green cheese. This is my belief and nothing will convince me otherwise."
Maybe it is the proper time to give an example of how science deals with hypothesizing an antecedent from a consequent. I take the liberty to give that example from my own experience.
In the late fifties I encountered a phenomenon whereby thin metallic films deposited by various means, including electrodeposition, always grew in the state of strong mechanical stress. At that time, there existed no good theory which would explain the origin of stress in such films. Having conducted numerous measurements of stress, and accumulated piles of experimental data, mostly obtained in specifically designed experiments, I set out to develop a theory of the stress origin. I cannot explain why and how the idea of the theory in question emerged in my mind, but my guess, based on the multitude of results, was to attribute the emergence of tensile stress in films to the egress of a specific type of defects in the crystals forming the film, the so called dislocations, to the surface of crystals.
At that time, the concept of dislocations was purely theoretical. In the early years of the 20th century, a German physicist Madelung calculated theoretically the strength of crystals. Madelung's theory was based on the well-established concepts of forces between atoms, ions, and molecules. Nobody could find any error in Madelung's calculations. However, the strength of crystals according to his calculation turned out to be about 100,000 times larger than the actually measured strength of real crystals. Very soon scientists realized that the discrepancy was due to Madelung's theory being valid for ideal (i.e. defectless) crystals, while the measurements were conducted with real crystals, where multiple imperfections of structure were inevitably present. The experimental technique of that time was not capable of observing those microscopic defects directly. While the presence of various defects could be inferred from indirect evidence, their precise character was not known. To explain the drastic difference between the theoretical and actually measured strength of crystals, three scientists (in England, Russia and Japan) simultaneously and independently suggested a hypothesis of a specific type of defects, to be named dislocations, being responsible for the drastic drop in crystal's strength. In the course of the next decades, a detailed theory of dislocations was developed, with an extensive mathematical apparatus.
Using Schneerson's classification, it was a theory belonging to the pure "from consequent to antecedent" type. Various phenomena had been explained by the properties and behavior of dislocations which nobody has ever actually observed. Nevertheless, despite objections by a few dissenters, most physicists believed in the validity of the theory of dislocation simply because it could consistently and logically explain a multitude of facts.
By the beginning of the fifties, the advances in electron microscopy allowed to observe certain microscopic features of crystals which were interpreted as the experimental manifestation of the presence of dislocations. This gave considerable support to the theory which until then was based only on pure logic and mental ingenuity.
When I came up with the idea of the dislocations' egress, it was not based on any direct evidence, since the dislocations themselves have not yet been directly observed. My idea of their egress was based on a pure imagination, as it very logically and consistently seemed to explain a wide variety of experimental data I'd accumulated. Of course, my theory was also of the "consequent to antecedent" type, according to Schneerson's classification. Its foundation was in pure logic and consistency, as it was based not on some single number, as in Schneerson's example, but on a multitude of facts and on the observed trends. In this form, the theory was published. There were some scientists who disagreed with my explanation, but they did not come up with a good alternative. Several years later, new advances in electron microscopy enabled scientists to see the dislocations directly. This fully vindicated the creators of the dislocation theory, once again demonstrating the power of scientific inference. Soon afterwards, some English physicists observed directly the egress of dislocations to the crystals' surface, which I surmised several ears earlier to be the reason for the tensile stress in films, based on the logical analysis of a multitude of experimental data. Of course, before the direct observation of the dislocations' egress, people like Schneerson could argue that my theory was based on the use of a weak method "from consequent to antecedent," that it was based on data obtained for a limited range of conditions, etc. However, the entire history of science proves the power of scientific inference, and the high plausibility of good scientific theories.
Several years later I set out to develop a theory which would explain the anisotropy of stress I observed in certain magnetic films. Again, my tools were logic and the plethora of experimental facts I accumulated. I suggested a theory which explained the observed anisotropy through the magnetic properties of dislocations at play in the course of their egress. The theory neatly explained in a fairly plausible way the entirety of the observed phenomena. However, nobody has yet been able to directly verify the assumed behavior of the moving dislocations, hence that theory has so far no direct experimental proof. Therefore I can't assert that the theory in question is true, as I could with the earlier theory of the stress origin. I tend to view, though, the theory of anisotropy as being plausible due to its ability to logically explain a multitude of facts.
These two cases exemplify two types of scientific theories. To one type belong the theories which have a direct experimental confirmation. Of course, there is always a possibility that new experimental evidence may contradict the theory. More often than not, though, it means not that the theory is necessarily wrong, but rather that the new data reveal the boundaries of the theory's validity. To the second type belong theories which have no direct experimental confirmation. The plausibility of such theories is based, first, on their logical consistency and the ability to reasonably account for all known facts, and, second, on the fact that other scientific theories which have been confirmed by direct experiments were developed by the same process of scientific inference which therefore is known to usually provide a plausible insight into reality.
How far is the real scientific method from the jejune picture painted by Rabbi Schneerson!
Schneerson specifically argued against the theory of evolution. One of his categorical statements was: "If you are still troubled by the theory of evolution, I can tell you without fear of contradiction that it is not a shred of evidence to support it." Wow! What enviable self-confidence! Rabbi Schneerson obviously had a very limited knowledge of the subject he dared to discuss. While the theory of evolution has many yet unanswered questions, to insist that there is no evidence supporting it was a display of monumental ignorance on the matter. There is an enormous amount of evidence supporting the theory of evolution, even though some of that evidence is incomplete.
Continuing his discussion, Schneerson displayed his position as an adherent of the so-called "young earth creationism." The defenders of that position maintain that the age of the universe is exactly as the Bible tells us, namely less than 6,000 years, and all the evidence pointing to the much older Earth (a few billion years) or the universe (about 15 billion years) are simply an illusion. He says: "Even assuming that the period of time the Torah allows for the age of the world is definitely too short for fossilization (although I do not see how one can be so categorical) we can still readily accept the possibility that God created ready fossils, bones or skeletons (for reasons best known to Him), just as He could create ready living organisms, a complete man, and such ready products as oil, coal, or diamonds, without any evolutionary process."
I can readily accept that the moon is made of green cheese, and you can readily accept that in Australia people walk with their bodies hanging upside down, and your friend can readily accept that sunset occurs when a sorcerer who dwells beyond the horizon grabs the sun ands pulls it into a cave. If such suppositions were viewed as legitimate and reasonably explaining the facts, maybe Schneerson's "readily accepted" assumption could also be considered seriously. Otherwise the idea offered by the "young earth creationists" and shared by Schneerson, of God having created, for unknown reasons, ready fossils, bones, or skeletons, etc, remains in the realm of fairly tales, and hardly deserves serious discussion, since it lacks any semblance of substantiation and is a preposterously arbitrary explanation aimed at saving blind faith.
Schneerson provided no arguments in favor of the Torah's story.All his argumentation was of a negative character whereby he tried to cast doubt on scientific theories. The essence of his argumentation was that since no scientific theory can be viewed as the absolute truth, there is no reason to doubt the Torah's story. Even if one disbelieves scientific theories, how does it prove the veracity of the Torah' story? What Schneerson left without discussion is what is (if any) substantiation for the Torah's story. If, as Schneerson asserted, science does not provide the absolute truth (which is true) scientific theories are at least based on facts and their logical interpretation, and survive a stringent process of verifications and tests. The Torah's story is not corroborated by any other reasonably reliable source. There is no reason to view it as anything more than a collection of ancient manuscripts on par with the Mahabharata or Greek mythology.
[1] The Rebbe did study in Paris, but his degree is from a small technical school (like an American junior college), not the Sorbonne. The Rebbe's grades were poor, and he was threatened with expulsion because of them. The Sorbonne has no record of the Rebbe's attendence and awarded him no degrees.
The Rebbe studied philosophy and the philosophy of science in Berlin, but was not
awarded any degrees.This is only one out of many times the Rebbe and Chabad misrepresented the Rebbe's educational background.
[2] See note 1.
[3] See note 1.
[4] See note 1.
[5] See note 1.