Divided Court Rules Seduction Claims Against Rabbi Mordechai Tendler Are Barred by N.Y. Law, Woman He Allegedly Seduced To Appeal

Law.com reports:

A woman has no claims against a Rockland County, N.Y., rabbi who she alleges counseled her to have sex with him as a way of overcoming her problems in finding a husband, a divided Appellate Division, 1st Department, ruled Thursday.

The woman, Adina Marmelstein, asserts in Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 117629/05, that, as a result of the counseling, she and Orthodox Rabbi Mordecai Tendler had sexual relations for five years ending in 2005 after the rabbi had abused her emotionally and physically.

In a 3-2 ruling, the 1st Department dismissed the two remaining claims against Tendler as being barred by a state statute that specifically rules out a cause of action for seduction.

Lenore Kramer of Kramer & Dunleavy in Manhattan, who represents Marmelstein, said she will take the case to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right since there were two dissenting votes.…

The allegations were not enough to overcome the bar against actions for seduction in Civil Rights Law §80-a, Justice Joseph P. Sullivan wrote. Marmelstein's two remaining causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress, he concluded, are "thinly veiled claims" for "seduction," a term that has been "broadly defined" by the courts in construing Civil Rights Law §80-a.…

At the trial level, Manhattan Justice Jane S. Solomon had dismissed Marmelstein's other two claims -- fraud and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She had not appealed that ruling.

In dissent, Justice John W. Sweeny Jr. concluded that, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition against actions for seduction, Marmelstein had made allegations sufficient to make out a claim of breach of fiduciary duty..…

The article goes on to describe a 2005 case where a woman initiated sex with her pastor. The woman also sought counseling from that pastor. The court dismissed the woman's claim for clergy malpractice but left open the possibility that the woman may have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Judge Sweeny, in his dissent, noted that breach of fiduciary duty may very well be present in the Rabbi Tendler case:

…Marmelstein's allegations, taken as true, Sweeny stated, describe a fiduciary relationship: Marmelstein consulted Tendler because he had held himself out as counselor with expertise in women's issues, and he abused the confidence she had placed in him "by inducing plaintiff to enter into a sexual relationship to satisfy his own desires."

Similarly, the claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was not "merely a seduction case," Sweeny wrote, but a claim that Tendler had "clearly exploited the vulnerability of the plaintiff to attain his own ends."…

Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph P. Sullivan disagreed:

…The fact that the Court of Appeals in Wende C. left open the issue of whether "under very different circumstances" a fiduciary relationship may arise between a cleric and a parishioner, Sullivan wrote, "does nothing to advance the dissent's position."

In Wende C., [Justice Joseph P.] Sullivan reasoned, there were no "veiled allegations" of seduction like those made by Marmelstein.

In other words, because the woman made claims of "veiled" seduction by Rabbi Mordechai Tendler, all claims of breach of fiduciary duty are void.

Following what appears to be the logic of the majority decision, anything less than forcible rape cannot qualify as breaching fiduciary duty. Therefore, if any non-vulnerable adult has manipulated sex with a clergyperson who is counseling them, no legal redress is available.

This seems to be an unusually narrow interpretation of the law. However, it does seem to follow New York State's pattern of allowing religion a wider berth than is common elsewhere in the United States.

An example is the lack of a requirement for background checks of day care workers and school teachers who work or teach in religious day cares and schools, while teachers in public schools and nonsectarian day cares must by law have a criminal background check before hire. Another example is the generally lax state enforcement of tax laws when dealing with religious charities like churches, religious schools, synagogues and yeshivot but a stricter level of enforcement of those same laws when dealing with nonsectarian charities.

At any rate, it seems that clergy abuse will need to be dealt with legislatively with a clearly drawn law defining its parameters. Barring that, unless this decision is overturned on appeal, it seems that Rabbi Mordechai Tendler's gift to New York will be a near-free pass for clergy to manipulate and bed the people who come to them for counseling.

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1187859736882

Divided Panel Rules 'Seduction' Claims Against Rabbi Are Barred by N.Y. Law

Daniel Wise
New York Law Journal
August 24, 2007

A woman has no claims against a Rockland County, N.Y., rabbi who she alleges counseled her to have sex with him as a way of overcoming her problems in finding a husband, a divided Appellate Division, 1st Department, ruled Thursday.

The woman, Adina Marmelstein, asserts in Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 117629/05, that, as a result of the counseling, she and Orthodox Rabbi Mordecai Tendler had sexual relations for five years ending in 2005 after the rabbi had abused her emotionally and physically.

In a 3-2 ruling, the 1st Department dismissed the two remaining claims against Tendler as being barred by a state statute that specifically rules out a cause of action for seduction.

Lenore Kramer of Kramer & Dunleavy in Manhattan, who represents Marmelstein, said she will take the case to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right since there were two dissenting votes.

The Rockland County synagogue where Tendler presided, Kehillat New Hempstead, had not moved to dismiss Marmelstein's claim for negligent supervision against it, but will now move for summary judgment based on the 1st Department's ruling, said its lawyer, Marcy Sonneborn, of Molod, Spitz & DeSantis in Manhattan.

Tendler's lawyer, Glen S. Feinberg of Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, said the rabbi is no longer associated with the 150-member synagogue, which he founded.

According to the decision, Tendler was known within the Orthodox Jewish community as a scholar, educator and community leader.

In her lawsuit, according to the majority opinion written by Justice Joseph P. Sullivan, Marmelstein averred that Tendler had advised her to have sex with him so that her "life will open up and men will come to her." She also claimed the rabbi had told her "he was as close to God as anyone could get" and having sex with him would be "her only hope."

The allegations were not enough to overcome the bar against actions for seduction in Civil Rights Law §80-a, Justice Joseph P. Sullivan wrote. Marmelstein's two remaining causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress, he concluded, are "thinly veiled claims" for "seduction," a term that has been "broadly defined" by the courts in construing Civil Rights Law §80-a.

Justices Richard T. Andrias and Bernard J. Malone Jr. joined in the majority opinion.

At the trial level, Manhattan Justice Jane S. Solomon had dismissed Marmelstein's other two claims -- fraud and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She had not appealed that ruling.

In dissent, Justice John W. Sweeny Jr. concluded that, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition against actions for seduction, Marmelstein had made allegations sufficient to make out a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Justice Milton L. Williams was the second dissenter.

In Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 4 NY3d 293 (2005), which involved a congregant who had initiated sexual relations with her pastor from whom she had sought counseling, Sweeny noted, the Court of Appeals had dismissed a claim for "clergy malpractice" but left open a determination of whether a claim for breach of fiduciary duty might be available.

The court in Wende C., Sweeny said, had expressly left open the breach of fiduciary duty question for claims "between a cleric and a parishioner under very different circumstances, not present here."

Returning to Marmelstein's case, Sweeny wrote, "those 'very different circumstances' may well be present here."

Marmelstein's allegations, taken as true, Sweeny stated, describe a fiduciary relationship: Marmelstein consulted Tendler because he had held himself out as counselor with expertise in women's issues, and he abused the confidence she had placed in him "by inducing plaintiff to enter into a sexual relationship to satisfy his own desires."

Similarly, the claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was not "merely a seduction case," Sweeny wrote, but a claim that Tendler had "clearly exploited the vulnerability of the plaintiff to attain his own ends."

Sullivan disputed the dissent's claim that Wende C. gave Marmelstein an opening within which she could raise a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.

The fact that the Court of Appeals in Wende C. left open the issue of whether "under very different circumstances" a fiduciary relationship may arise between a cleric and a parishioner, Sullivan wrote, "does nothing to advance the dissent's position."

In Wende C., Sullivan reasoned, there were no "veiled allegations" of seduction like those made by Marmelstein.

Comments

[Anonymous]

"it does seem to follow New York State's pattern of allowing religion a wider birth than is common elsewhere in the United States."

You mean berth, not birth.

[Bilaam's Donkey]

Nonsense. For public policy reasons, courts ANYWHERE in the U.S. do not interfere in consensual sexual relations, for ANY profession. It's not just rabbis, or religion in general. Had the seducer been a psychiatrist, the result would have been the same. You might not like the result -- but the opposite result would be much worse, as it would effectively give courts the power to rule and sanction our most intimate relationships, and the slippery slope would be very, very dangerous.

[aa]

do we have any pics?

[jewishwhistleblower]

(Survivor) v Kehillat New Hempstead: Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue
2007 NY Slip Op 06504
Decided on August 23, 2007
Appellate Division, First Department
Sullivan, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on August 23, 2007

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
First Judicial Department
Richard T. Andrias, J.P.
Joseph P. Sullivan
Milton L. Williams
John W. Sweeny, Jr.
Bernard J. Malone, Jr., JJ.

306
Index 117629/05

[*1] (Survivor), Plaintiff-Respondent,

Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, Defendant, Mordecai Tendler, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant Mordecai Tendler appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered June 20, 2006, which denied his motion to dismiss the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP,
White Plains (Glen S.
Feinberg and Katherine Hammond
GallÈ; of counsel), for
appellant.
Kramer & Dunleavy, L.L.P., New York (Lenore
Kramer and Jonathan R.
Ratchik of counsel), for
respondent.

SULLIVAN, J.

At issue on this appeal is the viability of plaintiff's causes of action for breach of [*2]fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since the complaint alleges nothing more than thinly veiled claims of seduction, prohibited by Civil Rights Law § 80-a and couched otherwise to avoid that statutory bar, we reverse and dismiss these causes of action.

The allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]), are as follows. In 1994, plaintiff became acquainted with defendant Mordecai Tendler, the founder and spiritual leader of defendant synagogue. Known within the Orthodox Jewish community as a scholar, educator and community leader, defendant held himself out as a counselor and advisor with an expertise in women's issues. In 1996, plaintiff began attending services at the synagogue. Defendant advised plaintiff with respect to her personal, legal and financial problems, and represented that he would assist her in finding a prospective husband so she would be able to marry and have children as she wished. Beginning in November 2000, the two began a sexual relationship that lasted through May 2005.

Plaintiff alleges that she was induced by defendant to engage in this physical relationship "as part of a course of sexual therapy which he represented would lead to her achieving her goals of marriage and children." He told her she was "closed to the possibility of finding a husband" and "would never find a husband in her current state." He advised her "to permit him to have sexual intercourse with her so that her life will open up and men will come' to her." He told her he "was as close to God as anyone could get," and engaging in sexual relations with him would be her "only hope." The relationship did not lead to the outcome plaintiff desired. Rather, she alleges, defendant "physically and emotionally abused [her] for his own sexual pleasure and gratification," and warned that if she told anyone about their sexual relationship he "would have her placed in a straight jacket," "have her put in the penitentiary," and "would turn the community against her."

The action was commenced in December 2005, asserting four causes of action against defendant and one against the synagogue for negligent retention. On defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) as against him, the court granted the motion as to the causes of action for fraud and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and denied the motion as to the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since plaintiff did not appeal from the partial grant of the motion, only the two latter causes of action are at issue here.

As to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the complaint alleges that defendant "occupied a position as fiduciary to the plaintiff . . . as her counselor, advisor and therapist and owed her a relationship of trust and confidence," which he breached. Plaintiff asserts that she was physically violated, her reputation impugned, and that she was ostracized from her synagogue and lost her standing in the community. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges that defendant engaged in conduct - including falsely inducing plaintiff into a sexual relationship, physically violating and abusing her, and causing her to be harassed, threatened, intimidated and ostracized by the community - which would and did result in severe emotional distress.

Pursuant to section 80-a of the Civil Rights Law, originally enacted as section 61-b of the [*3]Civil Practice Act (L 1935, ch 263), "[t]he rights of action to recover sums of money as damages for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of contract to marry are abolished. No act done within this state shall operate to give rise . . . to any such right of action." A cause of action for seduction is broadly defined to cover "any conduct on the part of a man, without the use of force, in wrongfully inducing a woman to surrender to his sexual desires" (Coopersmith v Gold, 172 AD2d 982, 984 [1991]).

Distilled to its essence, the complaint alleges that plaintiff was induced by defendant, who "represented himself as an advisor, a father figure and a god," to engage in a sexual relationship "as part of a course of sexual therapy which he represented would lead to her achieving her goals of marriage and children." Since the conduct alleged here falls squarely within the embrace of Civil Rights Law § 80-a, whether couched as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is not actionable.

In any event, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. "One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation" (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 874). "A fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation" (id., Comment a). It is thus clear that to maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the existence of a duty is essential. Plaintiff argues that since defendant held himself out as a counselor and advisor with an expertise in women's issues, he "owed a fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] and a duty not to abuse their relationship of trust and confidence."

"'Fiduciary' is a vague term, and it has been pressed into service for a number of ends" (Doyle v Turner, 90 F Supp 2d 311 [2000], affd sub nom Hughley v Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. and Health Care Empls. Union, 231 F3d 889 [2000], quoting D.W.M. Waters, The Constructive Trust 4 [1964]). The allegations that defendant held himself out as a counselor and advisor with an expertise in women's issues are merely general allegations; the mere giving of advice that is in turn accepted is not sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship.

Significantly, it should be noted that the complaint conspicuously avoids any reference to defendant as a rabbi or even an allegation that plaintiff was a member of his congregation. While he is alleged to have advised plaintiff with respect to her "legal, financial and personal problems," there is no allegation that he counseled her with respect to religious matters. No doubt, these omissions are intended to avoid entanglement with First Amendment concerns (see Langford v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 271 AD2d 494, 495 [2000] [cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of sexual relationship between a parishioner and a member of the clergy properly dismissed as it would require courts to "venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain"]).

We cite Langford merely to note the complaint's studied avoidance of any reference to religious counseling a curious omission in light of defendant's position as spiritual leader of the synagogue plaintiff attended. This, as we noted, is an obvious ploy to stay clear of the First Amendment (see Wende C. v United Methodist Church, 4 NY3d 293 [2005], cert denied 546 US 818 [2005]). That Wende C. left open the question of whether a fiduciary relationship may arise [*4]"between a cleric and a parishioner under very different circumstances, not present here" (at 299) does nothing to advance the dissent's position, especially since that case did not involve veiled allegations of seduction.

While plaintiff asserts that defendant "occupied a position as fiduciary . . . as [plaintiff's] counselor, advisor and therapist," there is no claim that he held himself out to be a professional counselor, that the parties had a professional relationship, that he was trained to be a therapist [FN1] in any particular specialty or even that he was counseling her in a specific area. On the contrary, she claims that he counseled her "with respect to her personal, legal and financial problems." That plaintiff may have succumbed to defendant's persuasive power and may have been exploited by him for his own sexual gratification is insufficient to impose a legal duty on him, entitling plaintiff to the recovery of damages. She must allege more than her subjective belief in defendant's rectitude and honesty. "[A] fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally" (United States v Chestman, 947 F2d 551, 567 [2d Cir 1991], cert denied 503 US 1004 [1992]). The dissent offers no authority to support its conclusion that defendant's alleged claim of expertise in a particular area coupled with advice to plaintiff, on which she allegedly relied, is sufficient for the imposition of a fiduciary duty.

While informal fiduciary relationships may be found to exist between friends or family members (see e.g. Penato v George, 52 AD2d 939, 942 [1976], appeal dismissed 42 NY2d 908 [1977]; Cody v Gallow, 28 Misc 2d 373 [1961]), in those cases the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary injury. Here the alleged harm is that plaintiff was sexually exploited, and as noted, actions based on such a claim are prohibited by statute.

Since the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is founded on the sexual relationship, it is also barred by § 80-a and should be dismissed as well.

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered June 20, 2006, which denied defendant Tendler's motion to dismiss the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress, should be reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint against said defendant.

All concur except Williams and Sweeny, JJ. who dissent in an Opinion by Sweeny, J.

SWEENY, J. (dissenting)
The IAS court denied defendant Tendler's motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that the issue involved a question as to whether his actions "betrayed a trust that plaintiff had reasonably placed in him, commencing well before she joined his congregation," [*5]not whether those acts were in conformance with religious practices.

Fiduciary relationships have been broadly defined and have been held to exist "in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in, and relies upon, another. Such a relationship might be found to exist, in appropriate circumstances, between close friends or even where confidence is based upon prior business dealings" (Penato v George, 52 AD2d 939, 942 [1976], citations omitted, appeal dismissed 42 NY2d 908 [1977]).

Plaintiff's allegations on this cause of action, taken as true, describe such a fiduciary relationship. Tendler held himself out as a counselor and advisor with expertise in women's issues, and was consulted by plaintiff because of his reputation. She initially consulted him regarding a number of personal issues and he encouraged the development of a relationship of trust and confidence. Once this relationship was established, he betrayed this confidence and abused his influence by inducing plaintiff to enter into a sexual relationship to satisfy his own desires.

The fact that the complaint makes no mention of Tendler as a rabbi or that plaintiff was a member of his congregation is not, as the majority argues, of significance. Plaintiff did not become a member of Tendler's synagogue until well after she had established a relationship with him while he was acting as her advisor on a number of issues unrelated to her search for a husband. Indeed, even when she sought his counsel and advice on that issue, she did not do so in the context of her religious practices, nor did she seek spiritual guidance or counseling. The majority's reference to Langford v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn (271 AD2d 494, 495 [2000]) is misplaced. The plaintiff in Langford "sought religious and spiritual counseling" from the defendant clergyman, which ultimately led to a sexual relationship between them. In dismissing the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the court there found the basis of that cause of action was clergy malpractice, which "would require the courts to venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain'." There is no claim here that plaintiff sought "religious and spiritual counseling" from Tendler, and since we must accept the allegations in the complaint as true for purposes of this motion, we cannot infer, as the majority does, that this is simply a pleading device [FN1] to circumvent the prohibitions regarding clergy malpractice and seduction. Indeed, a breach of fiduciary duty claim may be viable even in those situations where a plaintiff seeks spiritual counseling from a member of the clergy. In Wende C. v United Methodist Church (4 NY3d 293 [2005], cert denied 546 US 818 [2005]), the plaintiff sought ministerial counseling from defendant pastor who, like here, was not a licensed professional counselor. She initiated a sexual relationship with the pastor, and subsequently she and her husband sued the pastor and church for what amounted to clergy malpractice. The Court of Appeals found that with respect to the plaintiffs' claims that the pastor had breached his fiduciary duty to them, those claims were not specifically pleaded. The Court held that "Given that no fiduciary cause of action is properly [*6]before us, we leave open for another day the question whether such a claim may arise between a cleric and a parishioner under very different circumstances, not present here" (id. at 299). Those "very different circumstances" may well be present here, and the IAS court properly denied Tendler's motion to dismiss the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found the complaint regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress contained no factual allegations that Tendler encouraged his congregants to harass plaintiff. However, it found other allegations on this cause of action sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.

To prevail on a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or disregard the substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress (Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]). Liability will be found "where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp, 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983], quoting from Restatement [Second] of Torts § 46, comment
d).

Plaintiff alleges that Tendler repeatedly advised that her "only hope" of achieving her goal of getting married and having children was to engage in a course of "sexual therapy" with him. We must respectfully disagree with the majority that this is merely a seduction case. Rather, Tendler clearly exploited the vulnerability of plaintiff to attain his own ends. Allegations of this type of conduct have been held to be sufficient to survive a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss (see Sanchez v Orozco, 178 AD2d 391, 394 [1991], where the court reinstated the cause of action seeking damages for emotional distress, based upon the allegation that the defendant psychiatrist had persuaded the plaintiff to have sexual relations with him for her to obtain "therapeutic benefit"; see also Noto v St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. of N.Y., 160 AD2d 656 [1990] lv denied 76 NY2d 714 [1990]). The IAS court thus correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss this cause of action, and I would vote to affirm.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: AUGUST 23, 2007

CLERK

Footnotes

Footnote 1:A therapist is defined as a person "trained in applying occupational or physical measures in the treatment or rehabilitation of patients" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary [1993]).

Footnote 1:Or as the majority characterized it, a "ploy"

[Lev]

Poor woman still has hope before the NY Court of Appeals, one of the most respected courts in the Nation, if even they reject her, there are still Chief Justice and 8 Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court.
BTW, there is no doubt that the late Chief Justice Renquist, even in minority opinion, would bust the living hell out of the family of fighters with metzitza be peh.
His opinion in favor of this victim would be Persvaisive

[Yisroel]

What would the court say about a president, like Bill Clinton, would he also get off the hook?

[yona loriner]

failed u gotto get a life!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! yea maybe me too but u really need help!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[yona loriner]

failed u reallllllly gotto get a life!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[anonymous]

So Tendler won. Hmmm.

Slaughtered on the blogs.

Wins in court.

Will never recover his reputation.

He should go after the mamzerim behind this.

[Lev]

Yisroel, cursed galah Clinton didn't "get off".
He was disbarred and had to settle with women he attempted or actually raped.
You read Yated Neeman, you know that non-wearing yarmulke Senator is that paper's hero.
And his hero is a slime like Clinton, imah shmoi.

[Lev]

Anonimous, see my comment above.

[Shmarya]

He did not "win," if by "win" you mean have the allegations against him found false or not credible.

The civil case against him was thrown out on a legal technicality. In essence, a claim made by 3 of the 5 judges that NY State law does not recognize any clergy abuse linked to seduction.

If Rabbi Tendler had extorted the woman or forced her physically to submit, the case would have continued.

The majority holds that any manipulation done by Rabbi Tendler is equal to seduction, and seduction by clergy – even clergy counseling a victim – is not grounds for suit in NY State, as long as the victim is of age and not ruled a vulnerable adult.

To put this in perspective, if a psychiatrist did what Rabbi Tendler is alleged to have done, he would be reprimanded by his medical association and prohibited from treating patients for an amount of time that may be permanent.

The issue the court decided was not whether or not Rabbi Tendler slept with this woman or how many times he did so. The court simply ruled that, in absence of force or extortion, there is no grounds for civil proceedings against Rabbi Tendler.

In many other states, that would not be true. And, as it now stands, the woman is appealing this decision.

[anonymous]

Had the decision been reversed, everyone would be saying Tendler lost regardless.

You are just a whining sack of shit.

You, JWB, Polin, and others claimed all the evidence will come out.

It's not even a light fart.

The publication online of the RCA investigation stopped when it turned out one of the chief witnesses never even met the man but was busy listening to third hand information when she wasn't trying to communicate with her dead son.

Meanwhile Polin continues to "support the survivor" even though there isn't a shred of evidence to support her claims.

In the past year, you've gone from rational skeptic to off the wall looney endorsing everything that you feel makes religion look bad.

Let's face it, the man was convicted by bloggers and forced to court.

In whatever way, he won.

Now it's time to drop the "he got off on a technicality" and admit, nothing was ever proven.

He was accused. He was sued.

They lost.

He won.

So the cry babies are going to appeal.

Big deal. They'll lose again.

And Tendler will be back stronger than ever.

Because now the bloggers are his strongest weapon.

No one will believe you guys again when you cry wolf.

Let's see what happens in the other big cases and see if you are called to apologize to Kolko.

One thing Shmarya, you've been open and done all this under your own name.

That means it's easy to find you and sue you.

JWB and cohorts hid under the rocks.

Now they can crawl back there as...

THEY LOSE AGAIN!

Is that who your buddies are?

[Shmarya]

What a load of crap.

The court did not decide on the charges themselves. Again, it, in a split decision, ruled only on seduction and the legality of the charges based on seduction.

In other words, the gist of the charges were not ruled on.

The court in effect said that, if the charges are true, Rabbi Tendler seduced rather than raped the woman, and seduction is not grounds for civil penalties in New York State.

But of course, you know that.

[Shmarya]

As for suing me, feel free.

[Lev]

Anonimous, as I said, there are still TWO HIGH COURTS above!!!
Tendler is a brother-father-son-cousin of the man who tried to destroy a modern days Jewish hero, Reb Yitzhak Aron Fisher, shlita.
May be there is such a thing as payback.
I was the biggest sceptic on Kolko, but everything from dissolved Batei Din to the "private office with a bathroom"...

[Yisroel]

Would anybody vote for Clinton? The newspapers would have a lot of fun for four years.

[Dr Fred]

What happened to personal responsibility? The basic rule in dealing with anyone, rabbi or streetcleaner, is that as soon as a person asks you to do something conntrary to your moral code, you tell them to F*** off.Why can't people do this?

[grace]

Adina and the rabbi had a sexual relationship for 5 long years...she got dumped and then cried sour grapes....
instead of moving on with her life she sues?? give me a break..